A government-appointed independent reviewer warns the UKโs National Security Act 2023 is drafted so broadly that routine work could trigger border scrutiny, even when the person involved does not grasp the national security stakes.
In his annual independent review titled State Threats Legislation in 2024, Jonathan Hall KC warns that the National Security Act 2023 (NSA) and associated border powers contain definitions capable of ensnaring individuals who have “no idea” their conduct could be viewed through a national security lens.
The report, presented to Parliament this month, highlights that under the Schedule 3 border framework a person can be treated as “engaged in hostile activity” even if they do not know they are assisting a foreign state, or even if any foreign state is unaware of the alleged benefit. Hall also notes that some offences and tests can turn on what a person “ought reasonably to know,” which can create risk for people who are “innocent dupes” rather than deliberate agents.
One of the most eye-catching illustrations for the technology sector is Hallโs example involving encryption. He cites the developer of an app using end-to-end encryption to show how a “double-ignorance” scenario could arise, where a personโs work could be framed as being “in the interests” of a foreign state, even if neither the developer nor the foreign state has that intention in mind.
Read narrowly, this is an illustration of breadth and edge-case exposure, particularly in the border context, not a statement that building encryption is automatically a crime. As a practical matter, it suggests privacy-enhancing tools, from a VPN to secure messaging, could be pulled into scrutiny in some fact patterns.
“A person may be engaged in hostile activity if they do something which, unknown to them, threatens national security and which is in the interests of another State, also entirely in the dark,” Hall writes.
The “Unwitting” Spy
A recurring concern in the report is how the “Foreign Power Condition” and related concepts can be applied to people who are not classic espionage targets. Hallโs point is not that intent never matters, but that some powers, especially at the border, and some tests in the Act can reach conduct where the individual did not understand the national security implications, and authorities may still investigate or examine what happened.
The report warns that the law can capture “innocent dupes” who believe they are working for a legitimate business or charity but are inadvertently serving foreign interests. Hall illustrates how wide the concept can run by noting that even a lobbyist trying to persuade a chip manufacturer to build a factory in France instead of the UK could, on the wording, fall within a national security framing tied to economic well-being.
That warning lands against a measurable backdrop. Home Office statistics show 2,495 people were examined under Schedule 7 in Great Britain in the year ending 30 September 2025.
The Data: Who is at Risk?
The report offers examples showing the scope can extend beyond traditional spy-versus-spy cases. For instance, Hall discusses how activities like gathering or handling information can sit inside the framework, and how “materially assist” concepts can be read broadly. In practice, that means researchers who publish work openly, including code, may want to understand where the law draws lines, especially in scenarios where the “likely to materially assist” test is in play and the relevant knowledge or “ought reasonably to know” standard is alleged.
The scope is also framed as wide enough to include some service providers. Hall gives examples such as an embassy cleaner or cook, illustrating how providing support services could be scrutinised if the person being served is linked to foreign intelligence activity.
The Penalties
The financial and personal stakes for falling afoul of these laws are high. The most serious offences, such as espionage and sabotage, carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
Other offences, including assisting a foreign intelligence service, can carry maximum sentences of 14 years. Hall also notes there is no general public interest defence for whistleblowers written into this framework, which transparency advocates argue leaves limited statutory protection for disclosures.
The Bottom Line
Hallโs review stresses how broadly drafted definitions and powers can create uncertainty at the edges, and why careful use, clear guidance, and safeguards matter for journalists, researchers, and developers who operate internationally or handle sensitive information. While global attention often focuses on US-based security and surveillance efforts, the report argues the UKโs state threats regime also raises hard questions about where national security stops and ordinary work begins.
